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Proposed by Bush, championed by Gore, and promot-ed by Reagan’s financial advisor, the capitalistic cap-
and-trade system for cutting greenhouse gas emissions 
has garnered support between environmentalists and 
across political parties in the United States1. Ironically, 
China has embraced this free market response to cutting 
carbon dioxide emissions while the United States has 
turned to the Clean Power plan, which is regulatory rath-
er than capitalist in nature. Why is this the case? Which 
system will be ultimately more effective? 
THE CARBON PROBLEM
It is not breaking news that carbon dioxide is a major 
greenhouse gas that facilitates climate change and glob-
al warming. Carbon dioxide (CO2) accounts for 77% of 
greenhouse gas emissions around the world, and about 
82% of greenhouse gas emissions in the U.S. To demon-
strate its pervasiveness, carbon dioxide accounts for 
a larger fraction of greenhouse gases than methane, 
nitrous oxide, and fluorinated gases combined. Major 
sources of CO2 include consumption of fossil fuels and 
deforestation of plants that naturally consume CO2.
Cap-and-trade systems target emissions by companies 
in two sectors, electricity and industry, which are two 
of the largest emitters of carbon dioxide, accounting for 
over half of total carbon emissions. In the U.S. alone, elec-
tricity comprises 1,562 million metric tons of the approx-
imately 5,500 million metric tons of carbon emissions.12 
However, it is important to note that cap-and-trade does 
not address several additional sources of carbon emis-
sions, such as domestic heating and transportation.11
 Countries, regional jurisdictions, and international orga-
nizations have turned away from legislation and towards 
market-based cap and trade systems in order to curb 
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. These emissions trad-
ing schemes provide economic incentives for reducing 
emissions of pollutants. Many cap and trade systems fo-
cus on carbon emissions, and as a result, there are several 
large, lucrative carbon markets around the globe.  Since 
the first carbon emissions trading system began in the 
European Union in 2005, national emissions trading sys-
tems exist in Australia, Switzerland, New Zealand, Aus-
tralia, South Korea, China, and Kazakhstan, and some 
sub-national schemes are legislated in the U.S., Canada, 
and Japan.4
WHAT IS A CAP AND TRADE 
SYSTEM?
All cap-and-trade proposals have three elements in 
common: (1) a cap, or phase-out schedule (i.e., limits on 
maximum total emissions across all polluters per year); 
(2) tradable “emission allowances” (entities with excess 
emission permits can sell their excess allowances to en-
tities with a deficit of allowances); and (3) a formula for 
initially distributing the emission allowances based on 
previous levels. Alternately, a tax on carbon emissions 
imposes a fee that each polluter must pay on every unit 
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of carbon dioxide (or any other GHG) that is emitted into 
the atmosphere, which in turn provides an incentive for 
entities to reduce emissions. Both policies aim to reduce 
emissions by making it costly for firms and individuals to 
engage in activities that result in GHG being released into 
the atmosphere
Emissions trading systems are typically organized by a 
central authority, which sets a limit on the amount of a 
pollutant that can be emitted. This limit is then trans-
lated to emissions permits that allow the permit-holder 
to release a certain amount of a particular GHG, such as 
CO2. For example, the European Union Emissions Trad-
ing System (EU ETS) defines one allowance as one metric 
ton of CO2 or its equivalent in nitrous oxide or perfluo-
rocarbons. 
There is tension between the economically efficient 
method of distributing carbon and what is considered 
politically feasible. A popular method of free allocation 
provides companies a grandfathered percentage of car-
bon usage based on consumption from the previous year. 
A common alternative is by using the percentage quan-
tile of the industry benchmark.  Variations from their 
pre-allocated use make up the ‘trading’ component of the 
system. However, in an ideal economic system that gen-
erates the most revenue for the government, all credits 
for a given fiscal year are auctioned off by the regulatory 
agency in one large sale. Paradoxically, some of the free 
allocation schemes can give perverse incentives for com-
panies to emit more in a previous year; if a company fore-
sees that it will exceed its GHG emissions credits, it can 
purchase extra allowances from other companies. 
Large fines are imposed on companies that exceed their 
credits at the end of a compliance period. Thus, with only 
a finite number of emissions allowances distributed at 
the beginning of a compliance period, the carbon market 
is very active among carbon emitters. Over time, the cap 
for each year will decrease to slowly phase out emission 
of GHGs. The cap and trade system motivates companies 
to invest in clean, low-carbon technology in order to meet 
allowance limits.  
CARBON LEAKAGE
Carbon leakage is a potential problem and constitutes 
a loophole that companies take advantage of in order 
to avoid cutting emissions. Carbon leakage is not about 
holes in pipelines — rather, it occurs when companies 
take advantage of neighboring jurisdictions with less 
stringent regulation. For example, some companies can 
outsource their production to other countries with few-
er constraints on GHG emissions, thereby “leaking” car-
bon. The potential job losses raises concern for some 
labor groups, and potentially destructive environmental 
effects raise concern for activist groups.25 Company in-
tervention in foreign countries has been approached cau-
tiously.  Many emissions trading systems openly encour-
age the adoption of energy-efficient technology abroad. 
U.S. CLEAN POWER PLAN
In contrast with the free-market-based cap-and-trade 
system, the United States uses the Clean Power Plan, 
which establishes the first national standards to limit 
carbon pollution from power plants. While previous EPA 
regulations have limited emissions of soot, SOx, lead and 
certain chemicals, there have not been restrictions on 
carbon until this point. This plan hopes to reduce car-
bon dioxide levels by 32% below 2005 levels by 2030.3 To 
achieve this goal, the Clean Power Plan will establish a 
“trading ready” emission credit trading market between 
other states that do not design their own implementation 
plans by 2016. States that wish to participate in carbon 
trading have the option of engaging in their own regional 
groups or partaking in the proposed EPA-administered 
group.
The Clean Energy Incentive Program, a component of 
the Clean Power Plan, will award companies electricity 
credits for using renewable energy sources and for in-
vestment in energy efficiency projects in low-income 
communities. 
Opponents suggest that the Clean Power Plan and cap-
and-trade systems in general are regressive policies that 
disproportionately affect lower-income communities; 
lower-income households generally spend a larger frac-
tion of their income on energy. Currently, the average 
household generating under $50k annual household 
income has an estimated average of $22,390 in post-tax 
income. These households spend about 21.4% of their 
post-tax income, at $4,799, on energy costs from resi-
dential energy and transportation fuel.  In comparison, 
households generating over $50k in annual income hold 
an estimated average of $84,263 in post-tax income, and 
spend only 8.9% of it for energy costs.15
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Companies that are forced to participate in emissions 
trading can pass the costs of allowance trading onto 
their customers, which can potentially exacerbate the 
energy margin.  According to the Congressional Budget 
Office, a cap on carbon dioxide emissions would cause 
the lowest income bracket to spend 3.3% more of their 
total household income in energy costs, in comparison 
to the wealthiest income bracket, which will experience 
less than a 1.7% increase, which would be less than half of 
that of the lowest income bracket.16  
Proponents of cap-and-trade suggest that alternatives to a 
market based system would have a higher cost, and there-
fore a larger impact on low income communities. Legis-
lated mandate approaches would not find all the same 
least cost solutions that come out of a free market solu-
tion. Alternatively, governmental revenue gained by the 
purchase of allowances could be used to reduce individ-
ual income taxes, which bipartisan researchers suggest 
could offset the income disparity. This idea actually has 
been supported by both Al Gore and many Republicans. 
This revenue could also be used to fund environmental 
projects around the country or to offset other taxes. 
While carbon emission permits are allocated at the be-
ginning of a cap-and-trade program based solely on pre-
vious annual emissions, this conversion factor is lost in 
the market, as companies trading carbon permits across 
state borders do not factor in the amount of carbon diox-
ide being emitted per unit of electricity created. The dis-
tribution and trade of credits will depend on the type and 
cost of the good. The credits will vary from state to state; 
energy costs and requirements for heating in Northern 
States and air conditioning in Southern States may be 
higher than those in Pacific States where the climate is 
relatively mild. This would incur disproportionate effects 
on the economies of cap-and-trade systems, where cer-
tain companies could capitalize on the greater relative 
need of carbon permits in more highly-affected states.9
Thus, nationwide cap-and-trade system may be unable 
to normalize and provide for regional needs. The U.S. 
Clean Power Plan encourages states to independently 
form their own emissions trading programs. In design-
ing regional cap-and-trade systems, states must be aware 
of current energy distribution among local communities 
and how the price of energy will affect trading through-
out the year. 
PENNSYLVANIA’S DECISION
In September of this year, the Pennsylvania Department 
of Environmental Protection committed to a state-cen-
tric plan to comply with the national Clean Power Plan. 
The Clean Power Plan specified that Pennsylvania would 
reduce greenhouse gases created by industries and mu-
nicipalities by 33% by 2030, with a compliance period 
starting in 2022.5 
In 2012, 117 million tons of CO2 was released at the 
standard emission rate of 1,642 pounds CO2 per mega-
watt-hour. Under the Clean Power Plan, the 2030 target 
for a mass-based system is 90 million metric tons of 
emission, and the target for a rate-based system is 1,642 
pounds CO2 per megawatt-hour. 
Pennsylvania’s economic role as one of the country’s 
largest power producers and exporters complicates the 
state’s decision. In 2013, PA was the third largest ener-
gy-producing state, following Texas and Wyoming. Coal 
production alone accounts for 39,000 direct and indirect 
jobs and $7.7 billion of state gross domestic output.10
Pennsylvania chose not to join a multi-state cap and trade 
program so the state could balance its own state-centric 
plan with its unique energy economy and market. The 
state must consider how it can maintain its net export-
er status with the new system, or even if it should allow 
out-of-state trading. The state must balance economic 
impacts on industry while making sure vulnerable com-
munities do not face high costs for their own electricity. 
Pennsylvania wants to prioritize indigenous resources 
while maintaining a diverse fuel mix, while complying 
with emissions standards. Many economists believe the 
most cost efficient way to achieve these goals is through a 
cap and trade system. 
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CAP AND TRADE SYSTEMS IN 
THE U.S.
Many believe that the Clean Power Plan will perpetuate 
the creation of a larger cap-and-trade system in the U.S. 
There are currently three major cap-and-trade systems 
in the U.S.: the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) 
in the Northeast, the Midwest Greenhouse Gas Reduc-
tion Accord (MGGRA), and the Western Climate Initiative 
(WCI).  The RGGI was the first cap-and-trade system in the 
U.S., encompassing Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, Mas-
sachusetts, New Hampshire, New York, Rhode Island, 
and Vermont.  The RGGI, which focuses specifically on 
carbon dioxide emissions from the power sector, held its 
first auction in 2008.  In 2014, it had a cap of 91 million 
short tons of emissions, a carbon dioxide cap that will 
decline 2.5% each year from 2015 to 2020.  Tentatively, 
15,274,274 carbon dioxide allowances will be distributed 
for the next compliance period.17 
CHINA’S CAP AND TRADE PROGRAM
In comparison, China has taken a different approach to 
reducing GHG emissions.  The Chinese President Xi Jin-
ping will launch a Chinese cap and trade system to create 
a national market for GHGs in 2017.  This national system 
will be based upon the seven regional and provincial plot 
programs, which have successfully reduced emissions. 
Under China’s plans, China would not have a hard cap 
on the amount of CO2 emissions.20 Instead, it would give 
each sector or large company their own allowance alloca-
tion and allow companies to continue trading.  
Scientists predict that carbon dioxide emissions could 
feasibly stop rising by 2025 due to China’s slowing econ-
omy and weakening dependence on heavy industry for 
growth.  China will be following a “green dispatch ap-
proach,” with a goal of producing 20% of its electricity 
from renewables by 2030.21  
EU ETS
The European Trading System launched in 2005 as the 
world’s first and largest carbon market and is composed 
of 28 EU member states, Iceland, Liechtenstein, and Nor-
way, as well as all aviation operators flying over or in the 
EU. The European Trading System covers about 45% of 
total EU emissions; it addresses CO2 emissions from oil 
refineries and heat generation; nitrous oxide emissions 
from acid production; and perfluorocarbon emissions 
from aluminum production.  
The goal of the EU ETS is to stop the growth in emissions 
of GHGs by 2020. In order to achieve this goal, the cap on 
emissions must be reduced by 1.74% each year from 2013 
onwards. Thus, by 2020, GHG emissions will be 21% lower 
than in 2005 and approximately 20% lower than 1990 lev-
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els. According to this plan, by 2050, GHG emissions will 
be 80-95% lower than 1990 levels.  
Currently, the EU ETS is in its third phase. The first trad-
ing period was from 2005 to 2007, which served as a 
learning period in which the EU experimented with the 
allocation of credits.  The EU ETS began with a highly 
inefficient system — grandfathered credits were passed 
down rewarding prior work on emission-saving proj-
ects.13 The initial system led to an excess of allowances, 
essentially bringing the marginal price of credits to zero. 
The second trading period, from 2008 to 2012, saw a sur-
plus of credits despite a 6.5% reduction in emission cuts, 
due to the economic downturn, which decreased demand 
for energy-intensive oil and transportation. The third pe-
riod, from 2013 to 2020, hopes to phase out cost-free allo-
cation and allocate permits only using auctions.  
The amount of trading occurring in the ETS has been 
steadily increasing. Currently, most of the emissions trad-
ing volume is through over-the-counter (OTC) transac-
tions or financial exchanges, rather than auctions. At the 
same time, emissions trading is a large yet highly volatile 
business, as prices for a ton of CO2 are still fluctuating.
Opponents to pollution trading deem ETS as a 
“fraud-friendly system of credit swapping and market 
manipulation,” taking on an ethical stance opposing the 
idea that countries and companies are able to ‘buy the 
right to pollute.’ For example, the methodology certain 
companies use to gain credits is under increasing scru-
tiny. Investmenting in emission-saving projects halfway 
across the globe, such as Amazonian reforestation proj-
ects did, should not allow companies to continue emit-
ting GHGs at their own leisure in a factory in Europe.28
WESTERN CLIMATE INITIATIVE 
The Western Climate Initiative (WCI), launched in 2013, 
is a regional emissions-trading system that currently 
includes British Columbia, California, Ontario, Quebec, 
and Manitoba. In terms of emissions cuts, this is the sec-
ond largest emissions trading system, behind the EU ETS. 
Unlike the RGGI, the WCI covers six GHGs: CO2, CH4, 
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N2O, HFCs, PFCs, and SF6. In its first year, the system 
only applied to large electric power plants, and from 2015 
onwards it extended to fuel distributors.  GHG emission 
limits decreased by 2% each year until 2015, and should 
decrease by 3% each year from 2015 to 2020 if the plan is 
successful.23  
Within the WCI, California held its first auction of GHG 
allowances in November 2012, raising $630 million by 
selling pollution allowances, each entitling the buyer to 
one metric ton of carbon dioxide pollution.  Cross-region-
al trading took place in subsequent auctions that includ-
ed Canadian provinces. In these cases of cross-regional 
trading, allowances were generally sold for about $12 
apiece, but prices for one metric ton of carbon emissions 
have been sold for as little as $4.24 
Theoretically, this allowance trade would allow a power 
plant in Quebec to continue polluting without making 
energy-efficient changes as long as it invests in a Califor-
nia farm that is working to keep an equivalent amount of 
methane out of the air.  Some scientists insist that these 
gases are not comparable in size to each other, making 
this emissions trading system difficult as it may increase 
heavy, localized pollution. To avoid these hot spots, all 
parts of the country should be required to comply with 
national health-based air quality standards separate 
from cap requirements to ensure that one area does not 
bear a disproportionate cost of pollution. 
Eight other Western states initially joined as members 
of the coalition; however, some states, such as Arizona in 
2010, dropped out in the early stages of the planning. In 
the case of Arizona, the former Governor Jan Brewer stat-
ed that a cap-and-trade system would cripple Arizona’s 
economy. Instead, Arizona planned to expand its state-
wide solar power initiative.14 
CONCLUSION
Thus, the United States could, ironically, look to its ideo-
logical opponent, China, for policy guidance on the re-
duction of greenhouse gas emissions.  Having a central 
authority control all GHG emissions perpetuates a bu-
reaucratic bottleneck that stalls important advances that 
could be made to drastically decrease GHG emissions.  In 
the cases of the United States and the European Union, 
experimenting with credit swaps and having different 
caps can potentially lead to an efficient and effective cap-
and-trade system for decreasing GHG emissions. While 
China’s complete success has yet to be seen, the U.S. could 
benefit from moving away from a highly regimented 
system of control to a more capitalist model with which 
many other countries are beginning to be successful.  
